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The Reasonable Fee and Professional
Discipline
William C. Romell*
Profession: ... A calling requiring specialized knowledge
and often long and intensive preparation including
instruction in skills and methods as well as in the
scientific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying
such skills and methods, maintaining by force of organi-
zation or concerted opinion high standards of achieve-
ment and conduct, and committing its members to
continued study and to a kind of work which has for
its prime purpose the rendering of a public service.'
F OR CENTURIES lawyers have considered themselves to be mem-
bers of an unquestionably honorable profession, motivated
by a conscious sense of duty. They hold themselves to be pos-
sessed of sensitivity to the needs and problems of society, to the
established values of tradition, and to the inherent privileges
and rights of the individual citizen.
Needless to say, such standards of behavior and dedication
are almost superhuman-and perforce are slighted now and again
by members of the Bar in their preoccupation with the exigencies
of their daily work.
The respect and awe with which the learned man of the
Middle Ages was revered by an ill-educated, physically op-
pressed populace has been largely displaced in our time by a
pervasive atmosphere of skepticism. The philosophical and ritual-
istic mysteries which have long enshrouded the profession of law
are easily misinterpreted by a tough-minded public as mani-
festations of condescension if not disdain.
Occasionally the lawyers' insistence upon the utter rightness
of the law and the infallibility of its practitioners have provided
social critics with opportunity for witticism, to the delight of the
general public.2
* Member of the Cleveland, Ohio, Bar; A.B., Cornell University; LL.B.,
Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, G. & C. Mer-
riam Co. (1961).
2 Epitomized by the pomposity of the deathless lines "The Law is the true
embodiment of everything that's excellent. It has no kind of fault or flaw,
and I, my Lords, embody the Law." Gilbert, Sir William S., from his libret-
(Continued on next page)
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It is true that certain aspects of the legal profession are a
mystery to the majority of laymen. A client may not appreciate
the nice exercise in disciplined thought by which his attorney
negotiates a triumph of litigation. He ordinarily is unable to com-
prehend the legal complexities surrounding the facts of his case.
He is, in all probability, unaware of the demands which his
controversy places upon his counsel's ability, knowledge, judg-
ment, and ingenuity. But he does understand and appreciate the
value of his money-and that is the subject of this article. The
client balances the material results of the efforts of his attorney
against the fee which counsel charges as compensation for his
services, and every such exercise of a client's judgment carries
potential impetus to Mene, Mene, Tekel Upharsin3 against the
attorney and his reputation.
I have not concerned myself with those instances in which
an excessive fee has been exacted through deliberate fraud or
misrepresentation by the attorney. Nor have I speculated upon
the problems of conversion or misappropriation by an attorney
of his client's funds under the guise of exacting his fee, or upon
cases involving an alleged breach of a contract which stipulates
a fixed fee for services of counsel, or upon charges of champerty
or maintenance. The question propounded by this article is-
what exactly is the "reasonable" fee, and conversely under what
conditions may a fee be adjudged so unreasonable that the legal
profession may administer justifiable discipline to the attorney
charging such a fee?
The Philosophy of Fees
It might seem to an objective observer that the practice of
law, insofar as it provides its practitioners with their economic
livelihood, is a commercial expedition. Financial well-being and
independence, at least relative to the standards of the com-
munity, are significant stimuli to the development of high per-
(Continued from preceding page)
to for the operetta Iolanthe, Act I, Entrance of the Lord Chancellor. First
produced in collaboration with Sir Arthur S. Sullivan at London, England,
in 1882.
3 Roughly translated as "Thou art weighed in the balance and found want-
ing";-the words, written on the palace wall by a disembodied man's hand,
by which God condemned King Belshazzar for his godlessness. Belshazzar
was subsequently slain by the victorious King Darius of the Medes, and his
former kingdom divided. See the Old Testament of the Holy Bible, Book
of Daniel, Chapter 5.
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sonal integrity. Nevertheless, whenever the question of fee de-
termination arises, the ancient spectre of financial sacrifice ap-
pears simultaneously, awaiting as its proper due the unhesitant
embrace of all members of the profession.
In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession
is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere
money-getting trade.4
. . . attorneys owe a public duty to the court and to the
public to aid in the administration of justice, and that while
the laborer is worthy of his hire, nevertheless it must be
borne in mind that the law is a profession whose basis is
public service; that it exists to promote justice and to facili-
tate the actions of courts of justice, that it is not a money-
making profession, nor was it ever intended to be such.5
Although it may have been to the personal benefit of the
lawyers to keep this litigation going, the settlement effected
is a fresh demonstration that the leaders of our Bar are
motivated by a desire for professional service rather than
mere selfish gain.6
These last exhortations of court and canon can best be compro-
mised with the facts of Twentieth Century economics by giving
full weight to the word "mere." The profession continues to
honor its responsibility toward public service and justice, with a
realization that the professional powers of lawyers do represent
a potential for misdirected efforts in the interests of personal
avarice. The profession's philosophy of compensation is simply
this-the Law is primarily devoted to public service and perpetu-
ation of justice, but it allows its practitioners a compensation
commensurate with their professional efforts.
Measures of the Reasonable Fee
An attorney has the prerogative of establishing the fee which
he will charge to each individual client for the professional
services and counsel which he renders on behalf of the interests
of such client.7
Courts and text writers are unanimous in their opinion that
an attorney is entitled to receive the reasonable value of his
4 Canon 12, in part, of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association.
5 Prather v. First Presbyterian Society, 13 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 169, 185, 25
Ohio Dec. 613 (C. P., 1912).
6 Santen v. The United States Shoe Co., 25 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 363, 374 (Su-
perior Ct. of Cincinnati, 1925).
7 Goldstone v. State Bar, 214 Cal. 490, 6 P. 2d 513, 80 A. L. R. 701 (1931).
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services, in the absence of a formal contract, or a statute which
fixes the amount of his compensations.
Are there any judicial or administrative guides or standards
which will aid the attorney in his determination of the reasonable
fee under the particular circumstances of each case? Most as-
suredly-examples of approved and recommended measures of
reasonable compensation are many and varied, although some
are patently general. For example, lawyers are advised to avoid
the imposition of charges which either overestimate or under-
value their advice and services.9
The courts have proved prolific in providing the lawyer with
more specific mesures which, in varying circumstances, may be
applicable to fee determination. An attorney may properly con-
sider the time which he has devoted to the interests of his client;
the nature, intricacy, character, difficulty, and novelty of the legal
questions raised by the facts of a case; the amount of money,
or the value of property or other interests at issue; the attorney's
personal standing and professional reputation; the actual benefits
accruing to the client as a result of his services and counsel; the
attorney's loss of opportunity for other remunerative employ-
ment resulting from his occupation with a client's matters; the
character and aggressiveness of professional opposition to litiga-
tion; the degree of responsibility assumed by an attorney in
conducting a client's case-whether he was the sole attorney, or
merely assisting counsel; the degree of certainty or contingency
upon which his compensation depended; the doubtfulness of his
client's claim at law; whether or not the services and counsel
which he provided for a client were in fact necessary and es-
sential to the satisfactory conclusion of the cause; and, in a
growing number of instances, the client's financial ability to
pay.10
Other cases have set forth and approved such diverse meas-
ures as the amount of compensatory allowance granted or ap-
proved by courts, or customarily charged within the community,
8 Annot. 143 A. L. R. 672 (1943).
9 Supra note 4.
10 See Annot. 143 A. L. R. 672 (1943) and Annot. 56 A. L. R. 2d 13 (1957)
for an exhaustive review of these and other measures of attorneys' com-
pensation. Also see In Re Habant, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 446 (C. P., 1940); Prather
v. First Presbyterian Society, supra, note 5; Holmes v. Holland, Ohio Dec.
Rep. 768 (C. P., 1893); and Kittredge v. Armstrong, 11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 661
(Super. Ct. Cinc., 1892) for judicial exposition of a number of these meas-
ures of compensation.
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for legal services of a similar kind; 1 specific fees paid by clients
in other cases involving similar services; 12 whether the attorney's
employment was merely casual or for an established and regular
client;13 the minimum level of fees established by a local Bar
association fee schedule; 14 current economic trends, exemplified
by price and standard of living indices;"> and, in a few rare
instances, the attorney's professional overhead expenses. 16
The very number and variety of these possible measures of
proper legal compensation serve to illustrate the difficulty of
defining the reasonable fee. Attorneys exhibit a general reluc-
tance to pontificate upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of a fee charged by one of their number and contested by his
client, because of the subjective nature of such fees. Many courts
are aware of this reluctance. In at least one suit filed by an
attorney to collect his fee from a client unwilling to pay, a court
has stated expressly that the jury are in no way bound by the
testimony of other attorneys, acting as expert witnesses, to the
reasonableness of the fee charged unless they find, from all the
evidence, that such expert opinions are correct. 17
At least one court has wryly taken judicial notice of a cer-
tain esprit de corps among attorneys which prevents them from
interposing any objections to the allowance of counsel fees to
one of their number,' 8 and another court, in a remarkable out-
burst of emotion, taxed the local Bar in no uncertain fashion
by stating:
Many attorneys act upon the principle of the French min-
ister, Colbert, who in the matter of taxation always en-
deavored to pluck as many feathers off the goose as he could
possibly pluck, without making the goose squeal ...
11 McLean v. American Security & Trust Co., 113 F. Supp. 427 (D. C. Dist.
Col., 1953); Mabry v. Mudd, 132 Neb. 610, 272 N. W. 574 (1937).
12 Steckel v. Lurie, 185 F. 2d 921 (6th Cir., 1950), cert. den. 340 U. S. 953,
95 L. Ed. 687, 71 S. Ct. 572 (1951).
13 American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee v. Eisenberg, 194 Md.
193, 70 A. 2d 40 (1949); Smith v. Kash, 253 Ky. 447, 69 S. W. 2d 980 (1934).
14 Re Brown's Estate, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 291, 129 N. E. 2d 497 (P. Ct., 1954);
mod. on other grounds 98 Ohio App. 297, 129 N. E. 2d 509 (1954).
15 Mandel v. Curtis, 205 Misc. 856, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 132 (1954).
16 Re Lewi's Will, 199 Misc. 99, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 279 (1950), af!'d. 278 App. Div.
724, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 74 (1951).
17 Kittredge v. Armstrong, supra note 10.
18 Buschle v. The Buschle Manufacturing Co., 15 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 618
(Superior Ct. of Cincinnati, 1913).
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While it may not be known generally, it is well known to
the court that it is next to impossible to procure an attorney
to testify against another attorney in a claim made by him
for his fees. The species of free-masonry which exists among
professional men . . . seems to influence them and deter
them from testifying against their fellow members when-
ever a matter of their fees is involved. It is easy to secure
the testimony of an attorney to testify as to the reasonable
value of another attorney's fees, and the public generally
have come to look with distrust and disfavor upon the legal
profession because of this attitude on the part of attorneys
and their disposition to aid one another in securing as much
fees as it is possible to secure from the client.
Those men who have testified to the very large amount
which they have set as the reasonable value of plaintiff's
• . . services have not, in the opinion of the court, added
anything to their reputations as members of this bar, nor
have they, by their conduct, tended to allay the public feeling
that does exist against the legal profession.'9
This statement stands as a unique judicial indictment of its local
Bar and as an expression of true concern for the public's ap-
prehension of unrestrained commercialism of legal practitioners.
Judicial Powers of Discipline
There is today no doubt that the power to discipline an attor-
ney at law by means of private or public reprimand, suspension
from the practice of law, or disbarment is a power which rests
inherently and exclusively in the judicial branch of govern-
ment.2 0 Although the legislative branch may enact statutes which
set forth grounds for the discipline of attorneys, as well as pro-
cedures by which such discipline is to be administered by the
courts, such statutes are to be construed only as aids to the
judicial branch, and not as limitations thereupon.2 1 The courts,
19 Prather v. First Presbyterian Society, supra note 5. This case contains
a thoroughly instructive review by the court of extenuating circumstances
which serve the court as standards applicable to the determination of the
attorneys' proper fees.
20 In Re Nevius, 174 Ohio St. 560, 191 N. E. 2d 166 (1963); Gair v. Peck, 6
N. Y. 2d 97, 188 N. Y. S. 2d 491, 160 N. E. 2d 43 (1959), app. dis. 361 U. S.
374, 4 L. Ed. 2d 380, 80 S. Ct. 401 (1960), mod. on other grounds 191 N. Y. S.
2d 951, 161 N. E. 2d 736 (1959); Mahoning County Bar Association v. Franko,
168 Ohio St. 17, 151 N. E. 2d 17 (1958); Cleveland Bar Association v. Pleas-
ant, 167 Ohio St. 325, 148 N. E. 2d 493 (1958); In Re McBride, 164 Ohio St.
419, 132 N. E. 2d 113 (1956), cert. den. 351 U. S. 965, 100 L. Ed. 1485, 76 S. Ct.
1030 (1956); In Re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 89 N. E. 39 (1909).
21 In Re Nevius, supra note 20; In Re McBride, supra note 20; In Re Hart-
ford, 282 Mich. 124, 275 N. W. 791 (1937); State Bar Commission Ex Rel
Williams v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 P. 703 (1912).
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therefore, are entrusted with the power to protect both the in-
terests of society and the integrity of the Bar, through control
of the qualifications and performance of individual members of
the Bar.
Historically, an attorney at law may be disciplined for mis-
conduct or unprofessional conduct in office which involves moral
turpitude, or for conviction of a crime which involves moral
turpitude.2 2 However, through case law and judicial rules courts
have included acts which are contrary to honesty and good
morals,2 3 and those which bring discredit not only upon the
attorney personally but upon his profession and the courts.24
As a result of this expansion of judicial control and adminis-
tration of disciplinary powers, there is now little question that
the charging of an unreasonable fee and/or may subject an attor-
ney to disciplinary action. Still, the determination of the reason-
ableness or unreasonableness of a legal fee is a matter of equiv-
ocation and rationalization by the courts. The search for fine
legal distinction does not always satisfy a public hungering for an
occasional rule of law laid down with the certainty of a Minos25 -
at least when dealing with the determination of a reasonable
attorney fee.
Judicial Definition of the Unreasonable Fee
It is a general principle of law that an excessive fee, stand-
ing bereft of evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or moral
turpitude, is not alone sufficient ground for disciplinary action
against the attorney26 and this is held to be true even though
22 Ohio Revised Code Sec. 4705.02 states "The supreme court, or court of
appeals, or court of common pleas may suspend or remove an attorney at
law from office or may give private or public reprimand to him as the na-
ture of the offense may warrant, for misconduct or unprofessional conduct
in office involving moral turpitude, or for conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude ... ." See also In Re Bickley, 4 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 129, 16
Ohio Dec. N. P. 569 (C. P., 1906) for a strict construction of this language.
23 Stanford v. State Bar of California, 15 Cal. 2d 721, 104 P. 2d 635 (1940).
24 In Re McBride, supra note 20. See also Rule XVIII (5) (a) and Rule
XIX, Section 1 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
effective July 1, 1964.
25 Minos was the legendary son of Zeus (primus inter pares of the myth-
ological Greek gods) and Europa. He was appointed judge of the dead,
passing his inexorable final judgment upon their souls.
26 Re Myrland, 54 Ariz. 284, 95 P. 2d 56 (1939); In Re Woodworth Et Al,
31 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 107 (C. P., 1933); 7 C. J. S. 23, Attorney and Client.
Jan., 1965
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subsequent events may prove the fee to have been unreasonably
large, or the services for which it was exacted unnecessary. 27
There exist, however, modifications of the terms "excessive"
or "unreasonable" fee. A fee which is clearly excessive, or one
which is so excessive that it could not possibly have been
charged in good faith (therefore, presumably, having been
charged in bad faith) will warrant disciplinary action.28
An attorney will be subject to such action if his fee for
specific services is so excessive and disproportionate in relation
to those services as to be oppressive and to the point of
extortion.29
Further, it is a manifestation of bad faith and misconduct
on the part of an attorney if his fee leads to a finding that he
clearly intended to overreach his client in the exaction of his
fee, which is considered stained with moral turpitude.30
Other terms which appear in judicial opinions in an attempt
to define unreasonable fee are "unconscionable," i.e. "not guided
or controlled by the conscience, and lying outside the limits of
what is reasonable or acceptable: shockingly unfair, harsh, or
unjust: outrageous," and "exorbitant," defined as that which ex-
ceeds "in intensity, quality, force, power, scope, or size the
customary, due, or appropriate limits: grossly exceeding normal,
customary, fair, and just limits." 31
Several courts have rejected this sort of semantic equivoca-
tion and postulated what is probably a real practical standard:
judgment by the court itself. This is well stated by the court
in the case of Goldstone v. State Bar:32
27 In Re McCray, 1 Ohio App. 421 (1913); 7 C. J. S. 23, Attorney and Client.
In the McCray case, the court approved, without particular comment there-
upon, the payment of a fee of $5,000 which had been agreed upon by the
attorney and his client for legal services to be rendered in obtaining the
return of bank certificates of deposit valued at $26,500, which were owned
by the client and in the possession of the bank cashier. The attorney pre-
pared and filed a petition for injunction against the cashier, but the certifi-
cates were subsequently returned without action being taken, through the
intervention of the bank's attorney and the county sheriff.
28 State Ex Rel Nebraska State Bar Association v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84
N. W. 2d 136 (1957); State v. McIntyre, 238 Wis. 406, 298 N. W. 200 (1941);
Re Myrland, supra note 26.
29 Jackson v. Campbell, 215 Cal. 82, 8 P. 2d 845 (1932); Husk v. Blancand,
155 La. 816, 99 So. 610 (1924).
30 Re Quinn, 25 N. J. 284, 135 A. 2d 869, 70 A. L. R. 2d 956 (1957); People
Ex Rel Chicago Bar Association v. Green, 353 IU. 638, 187 N. E. 811 (1933).
31 Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, supra note 1.
32 Supra note 7.
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We are of the opinion that if a fee is charged so exorbitant
and wholly disproportionate to the services performed as to
shock the conscience of those to whose attention it is called,
such a case warrants disciplinary action by this court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Other courts have also expressed a preference for this shock-
the-conscience doctrine.3 3 A fee which has been charged by an
attorney as compensation for services and counsel rendered by
him to a client will be considered sufficiently unreasonable so as
to warrant his discipline if the organized Bar of which he is a
member adjudges his fee to be so unreasonable, and if the judg-
ment of the Bar is sustained by the judgment of the courts.
Examples of the Reasonable and Unreasonable Fee
It might be expected that a review of the leading cases in
which disciplinary action was either administered or refused by
the courts would dispel any lingering confusion and uncertainty
as decisively as a rinse cochon 34 dissipates a lingering sabbath
eve overindulgence. Such is not the case.
For one thing, there are many instances of disciplinary action
against attorneys which to some extent involve a charge of ex-
cessive fee setting, but very few in which such a charge is the
primary one. In Lake County Bar Association v. Coppernan,35
a charge that the attorney extracted exorbitant fees in five
specific cases was only one of six counts. In Cleveland Bar
Association v. Fleck,36 the court appeared less concerned with
excessive fees than with the defendants' ingenious procedure
which afforded them fees larger than they were entitled to by
special law.
In Re Reilly,37 a two-year suspension from the active prac-
tice of law was based upon concealment by attorneys of the fact
that the value of bonds which they had accepted in payment of
legal fees had appreciated substantially in excess of the agreed-
upon fees.
33 Re Richards, 202 Ore. 262, 274 P. 2d 797 (1954).
34 A concoction consisting of two teaspoons of cassis (an alcoholic syrup
made from black currants) added to a glass of chilled white wine. This
remedy for some reason has failed to gain popularity in the United States
equal to that which it enjoys among the inhabitants of Burgundy.
35 173 Ohio St. 330, 19 Ohio Ops. 2d 154, 181 N. E. 2d 903 (1962).
36 172 Ohio St. 467, 178 N. E. 2d 782 (1961), cert. den. 369 U. S. 861, 8 L. Ed.
2d 19, 82 S. Ct. 948, reh. den. 370 U. S. 914, 8 L. Ed. 406, 82 S. Ct. 1254.
37 177 Ore. 584, 164 P. 2d 410 (1945).
Jan., 1965
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In Goldstone v. State Bar,38 a client retained an attorney to
assist him in the processing of a claim which he had filed previ-
ously with the state Industrial Accident Commission, unaware
that his claim had resulted in an award of benefits by the Com-
mission. The attorney examined his client's claim file at the
Commission offices, discovered the award, and accompanied his
client to the office of the state's insurance carrier, where he
provided the identification which enabled his client to collect that
portion of his award then due and payable. The attorney charged
a fee equal to 40 per cent of the portion of the award collected
by his client ($310 out of $882.96), and later attempted to obtain
an additional amount. The court ruled that the fee was wholly
disproportionate to the services rendered, and that such flagrant
overreaching justified the attorney's suspension from the practice
of law for three months.
In Herrscher v. State Bar,39 an attorney was charged with
collecting a fee of $23,000 for services rendered over a period of
seven months, and later claiming additional fees of $50,000 for
representing the spouse of his then incompetent client in the
spouse's personal capacity as well as in her capacity as guardian
of her husband. The California Supreme Court applied precisely
the same principles which it had laid down in the preceding
Goldstone case, but reached the opposite conclusion, holding that
although the fees were large and probably excessive, the cir-
cumstances of the case did not invoke the rule that the fee was so
exorbitant as to shock the conscience of those to whose attention
it was called.
In Re Quinn,40 an attorney attempted to collect a fee of
$5,000 for recovering property valued at between $18,000 and
$33,000 by opposing expert witnesses. The attorney claimed that
the sum of $1,000 which he had been paid represented only a
portion of a 331/3 per cent contingent fee, while his client main-
tained that the $1,000 constituted the entire fee upon which the
two had agreed. In approving the attorney's contention, the court
reasoned that, even though the client had paid his son $7,000 for
the son's alleged share of the disputed property, a true value
of only $22,000 (well within the limits established by the expert
witnesses) would support the contingent fee contract alleged by
88 Supra note 7.
39 4 Cal. 2d 399, 49 P. 2d 832 (1935).
40 Supra note 30.
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the attorney. Furthermore, in such a matter existing doubt must
be resolved in favor of the attorney who had 30 years of expe-
rience and an unblemished professional record, and who is not
likely to have demanded an unconscionable additional fee if he
had in fact agreed initially to a fixed fee of $1,000.
The Special Problem of the Contingent Fee
In a series of cases courts show increasing concern over the
level of fees charged on a contingent basis, where in many in-
stances both the amount and character of the services by and the
results to be anticipated are uncertain at the outset.
In State v. Barto,41 an owner of stock engaged an attorney
to negotiate the sale of such stock, after he himself had attempted
unsuccessfully to sell it for $2,300. The client was in necessitous
circumstances, and the stock represented practically his only
property. The attorney disposed of the stock for the sum of
$1,200, retaining $600 of the proceeds as his fee. The court
branded this fee as extortionate, unfair, unreasonable, and one
into which no attorney had a right to enter with a client, and
approved the attorney's disbarment.
Several years later, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a
contingent fee equal to 40 per cent of a $3,000 legacy collected by
two attorneys on behalf of needy clients was excessive, but no
discipline was ordered in view of the facts that the attorneys
were but 22 and 24 years of age respectively, with no previous
experience in the collecting of commercial claims, and apparently
had acted in good faith in the establishment of the fee.
42
In 1941, a majority of the judges of the federal District Court
for the District of New York expressed the opinion that a 50
per cent contingent fee contract was ipso facto oppressive and
unreasonable. 43 However, a suspension ordered in the case was
not based upon this opinion.
The following year the Supreme Court of Louisiana was
presented with a disciplinary action involving similar circum-
stances.44 An attorney originally agreed to represent a client for
a contingent fee equal to 40 per cent of the amount which
41 202 Wis. 329, 232 N. W. 553 (1930).
42 People Ex Rel Chicago Bar Association v. Lotterman, 353 Inl. 399, 187
N. E. 424 (1933).
43 Re Chopak, 43 F. Supp. 106 (D. C. N. Y., 1941).
44 Re Novo, 200 La. 833, 9 So. 2d 201 (1942).
J)an., 1965
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might be recovered, but later obtained a second agreement with
his client calling for a contingent fee equal to 50 per cent of any
eventual recovery, in view of the fact that the case had been
before the courts for two and one-half years, had gone to the
Court of Appeals twice, and had been before the Supreme Court
once on certiorari. The Supreme Court ruled that discipline of
the attorney on the charge of establishing an unreasonable fee
was unwarranted, because it appeared clearly that the second
agreement had been accepted freely and voluntarily by the client.
The attorney was suspended for a six-month period on grounds
not associated with the charging of fees.
This atmosphere of judicial equilibrium with respect to the
ethical propriety of the contingent fee contract, and particularly
the 50 per cent contingent fee contract, was shattered by the
case of Gair v. Peck.45 The controversy in this case arose over
the promulgation and application by the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York for the First Judicial
Department of its Rule of Practice No. 4, applicable to the es-
tablishment of contingent fees in claims or actions for personal
injury or wrongful death. The applicable portion of this Rule
provided:
The receipt, retention or sharing of compensation which is
in excess of such scheduled fees [contained in a schedule set
forth in another section of the Rule] shall constitute the
exaction of unreasonable and unconscionable compensation
in violation of Canons 12 and 13 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics of the New York State Bar Association, unless au-
thorized by a written order of the court as hereinafter
provided.
The fee schedule set forth by the court allowed, without the
written approval of the court fees not in excess of either (1) 50
per cent of the first $1,000 of the sum recovered, 40 per cent of
the next $2,000, 35 per cent of the next $22,000, and 25 per cent
of all sums in excess of the first $25,000, or (2) a sum not
exceeding 331/3 per cent of the total sum recovered, if the initial
contract between attorney and client so provides.
In the reviewing court's opinion sustaining the inherent
power of the Appellate Division to adopt and enforce the pro-
visions of its Rule 4, it was expressly noted that the plaintiff
attorneys questioned neither the reasonableness of the Rule nor
the need for such a judicial control over the establishment of
45 SupTa note 20.
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contingent fees in those two specific actions to which the Rule
applies.
In concluding the preamble to its Rule 4, the court of New
York's First Appellate Division expresses its unequivocal opinion
that a contingent fee which reaches or approaches a sum equal to
50 per cent of the amount to be recovered ceases to represent a
valid measure of compensation and makes the attorney a partner
in his client's cause. Such a situation, in the opinion of the court,
is neither a permissible professional relationship nor a proper
professional practice.
Conclusion
The foregoing review of the problems which beset without
favoritism both the inexperienced and experienced legal practi-
tioner in their attempts to set equitable and reasonable fees has
presented no solutions, because there are none. An attorney's
estimate of the fees which are deserved in recompense for his
services and counsel is one of the major criteria by which his
clients judge their satisfaction with his efforts. There is a cer-
tain quotation which, in its own inimitable way, remains a con-
cise and homely reminder of the problem of the reasonable fee-
In other professions in which men engage-
The Army, the Navy, the Church, and the Stage-
Professional license, if carried too far,
Your chance of promotion will certainly mar,
And I fancy the rule might apply to the Bar- 46
46 Gilbert, Sir William S., Iolanthe, supra note 2.
Jan., 1965
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